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DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF PRISON TRANSFERS
Eugene Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the several anomalies of prison life is the disparate pro-
tection afforded inmates transferred to higher security. Although
both punitive and administrative transfers often place the inmate
in the same building under almost identical conditions, only disci-
plinary transfers are generally conceded to give rise to due process
protection. The inmate confined in isolation for fifteen days as
punishment for misconduct is guaranteed a hearing with advance
written notice and the rights to present testimony and receive a
written decision.1 On the other hand, the prisoner confined indefi-
nitely in segregation for supposed administrative reasons has such
due process rights only if the state decides to provide them.2 Con-
sequently, the most severe sentence that can be handed down by a
committee hearing a disciplinary charge is not fifteen days in isola-
tion or loss of good time, but rather the vague and foreboding
phrase "referred for high security." s This article will discuss the
background and application of the distinction between the puni-
tive and administrative elements of prison transfers, focusing upon
its effects on the due process rights of inmates in Virginia prisons.
II. DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Wolff v. McDonnell4 was the first Supreme Court case dealing
with due process protections in the context of prison disciplinary
proceedings. Wolff effected the first limitation on the discretion of
prison officials in the movement and punishment of inmates
charged with institutional infractions by holding that inmates
faced with loss of good time credit because of alleged misconduct
* Attorney with Neighborhood Legal Aid Society, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., University of
Massachusetts, 1967; J.D., New York University, 1970.
1. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1974).
2. In Virginia, an order confining an inmate to indefinite segregation is reviewable every
45 to 90 days. VMGINiA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, Div. GumFLiNEs OF ADULT SERvICEs No. 823
(VIII)(C)(3) (Nov. 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as GumaLNEs].
3. See, e.g, id. at No. 861 (VI)(H)(5)(b)(i) (Nov. 29, 1977).
4. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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were entitled to due process protections. The Court recognized
that the United States Constitution does not guarantee credit for
good behavior in prisons. Yet the Court found that the state had
given "the prisoners' interest [in retaining good time credit] .. .
real substance . ..embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'lib-
erty'" by providing a statutory right to good time credit and speci-
fying that it was to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior.5 The
Court reasoned that liberty, like property rights, could not be lim-
ited without the procedural protections required by due process,'
in that "the touchstone of due process is the protection of the indi-
vidual against arbitrary action of government."7
In an important yet often neglected footnote in Wolff, the Court
noted that "it would be difficult for the purposes of procedural due
process to distinguish between the procedures that are required
where good time is forfeited and those that must be extended
when solitary confinement is at issue."8 The footnote continued
with a caveat, however, that the Court did not intend to suggest
"that the [due process] procedures required by today's decision
. ..would also be required for the imposition of lesser penalties
such as the loss of privileges.""
Two years after Wolff a Massachusetts inmate argued that he
was entitled to due process protections in conjunction with trans-
fer from a medium to a maximum security prison. This argument
was rejected in Meachum v. Fano10 because the Court held that a
protected "liberty interest" was not implicated in such a transfer.11
The Court refused at the outset to apply the "grievous loss" test,
in view of the Court's ruling in Board of Regents v. Roth 2 that it
is "not ... the 'weight' but . .. the nature of the interest at
stake" that determines whether the requirements of due process
apply.13 Stressing the latitude granted to the state by virtue of a
criminal sentence to confinement, the Meachum Court also
5. Id. at 557.
6. Id. at 557-58. The analogy between liberty and property rights has been highlighted in
subsequent lower court opinions. See Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1251 (6th Cir. 1977);
Arsbery v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 46 (8th Cir. 1978).
7. 418 U.S. at 558 (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889)).
8. 418 U.S. at 571 n.19.
9. Id. at 572 n.19.
10. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
11. Id. at 226-28.
12. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
13. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis in original).
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squarely rejected the use of any impact criteria for identifying pro-
tected interests: "Confinement in any of the State's institutions is
within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction
has authorized the State to impose." '14 The Court distinguished
Wolff by stating that the interest in being granted good time credit
absent misbehavior, at issue in Wolff, "had its roots in state law." 15
Since Massachusetts had not provided the prisoner any right to
remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned and had not
specified that transfer from the initial prison required proof of the
specific acts of misconduct, "[t]he predicate for invoking the pro-
tection of the Fourteenth Amendment" was "totally
nonexistent."1
In Montanye v. Haymes,17 decided on the same day as
Meachum, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, which
in an opinion substantially more limited than that in Meachum
had excluded administrative transfers from any due process re-
quirements. ' The Court rejected as overly broad the Second Cir-
cuit's holding that "[o]nly disciplinary transfers having substantial
adverse impact on the prisoner were to call for procedural [protec-
tions]." 19 The Court refused to accept even this limited rule be-
cause it was based on impact criteria and because no expectation
of not being punitively transferred absent a finding of misconduct
existed under state law. Because New York law did not make ei-
ther administrative or disciplinary transfers "conditional upon or
limited to the occurrence of misconduct,"2 0 no expectation was
found and no hearing required. The Court restated the holding of
Meachum as also resting on an entitlement basis:
[N]o Due Process Clause liberty interest of a duly convicted prison
inmate is infringed when he is transferred from one prison to an-
other with the state, whether with or without a hearing, absent some
right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he will not
be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of
other specified events.21
14. 427 U.S. at 225.
15. Id. at 226.
16. Id. at 226-27.
17. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
18. 505 F.2d 977 (1974) (summary judgment in favor of prison officials reversed and re-
manded because of factual issues related to possible denial of due process).
19. 427 U.S. at 242.
20. Id.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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Justice Brennan, who dissented in both Meachum and
Montanye, has been critical of the Court's shift from the "grievous
loss" or "impact" test to the entitlement test. He has charged that
Meachum is evidence that the Court "has veered from its promise
to recognize that prisoners, too, have liberty interests that cannot
be ignored."22 One commentator has urged that this shift in tests is
unresponsive to the "daily realities of prison existence," presenting
a " 'formal' conception of legal rules" which, although easier for
courts to apply, appear arbitrary to inmates whose most important
concerns are beyond the reach of court review. 23 Another commen-
tator believes Meachum and Montanye constitute the utilization
of a modified "hands off" policy of courts faced with prison
problems.24 Under this view, the Court, upon finding itself unable
to formulate appropriate standards in light of the complex and
countervailing interests involved in prison situations, simply aban-
doned the problems presented by prisons to the states. 5
Not all the discussion of the shift to the entitlement view has
been critical. The Sixth Circuit in Walker v. Hughes28 praised that
change as being more consistent with Board of Regents v. Roth27
and Morrissey v. Brewer,28 which focused on the nature rather
than the weight of the individual's interest. The Walker court
stressed that "the requirement of an entitlement provides an ap-
propriate basis for compromise between the need for the protec-
tion of individual interests and the need for government action un-
hampered by procedural burdens," whereas "[a] standard of
grievous loss would interfere more directly with governmental
responsibilities. 29
Two years after Meachum and Montanye, the Supreme Court in
Enomoto v. Wright ° summarily affirmed a three-judge panel deci-
sion involving a California class action challenging transfer to ad-
ministrative segregation. The lower court had initially applied an
22. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAV. L.
REV. 489, 496 (1977).
23. Note, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REv. 405, 407, 412-13, 431 (1977).
24. Note, Involuntary Interprison Transfers of State Prisoners After Meachum v. Fano
and Montanye v. Haymes, 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 845, 880 (1976).
25. Id.
26. 558 F.2d 1247, 1251 (1977).
27. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
28. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
29. 558 F.2d at 1251.
30. 434 U.S. 1052 (1978), summarily aff'g 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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impact test, stating that transfer of an inmate to maximum secur-
ity for administrative as well as disciplinary reasons resulted in
"severe impairment of the residuum of liberty which he retains as
a prisoner-an impairment which triggers the requirement for due
process safeguards."3 1  The court attempted to distinguish
Meachum and Montanye by contending that those cases "hold
only that some discretionary decisions of prison officials, such as
the decision to transfer a prisoner to another institution, do not
result in such a substantial invasion of a prisoner's liberty interest
as to trigger the need for due process protections. 3 2 On the other
hand, the district court found, the transfer to maximum security
involved in Enomoto was subject to a more limited discretion on
the part of prison officials. Such discretionary restraint was in-
ferred by the court from the regulations of the California Director
of Corrections, which provided:
Inmates must be segregated from others when it is reasonably be-
lieved that they are a menace to themselves and others or a threat
to the security of the institution. Inmates may be segregated for
medical, psychiatric, disciplinary, or administrative reasons. The
reason for ordering segregated housing must be clearly documented
by the official ordering the action at the time the action is taken.""
On the basis of this rather generally worded directive, the court
shifted from an impact to an entitlement basis and determined
that "the inmate has an interest, conferred by statewide regulation
and protected by due process, in not being confined in maximum
security segregation unless he is found, for clearly documented rea-
sons, to come within the standard set by the rules."'"
The Supreme Court holding that summary decisions constitute a
review on the merits and are consequently binding on the lower
courts35 has been substantially limited in recent years.36 Conse-
31. Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397, 402 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 403 (quoting RuLES AND REGULATIONS OF THE DIREcToR OF CORRECTIONS, ch. 4,
art. 6, § 3330(a) (emphasis added by court)).
34. 462 F. Supp. at 403.
35. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975).
36. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979)
(precedential value of summary affirmance limited to precise issues necessarily decided);
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177-79 (1977) (district court should conduct independent
examination of merits of constitutional issue instead of relying upon summary affirmance as
controlling precedent).
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quently, the precedential value of Enomoto, which summarily af-
firmed a decision apparently inconsistent with Meachum and
Montanye, is uncertain. However, in 1980 the Supreme Court
again discussed Enomoto as well as Meachum and Montanye.
Vitek v. Jones37 involved the transfer of a state inmate to a
mental hospital. The Court distinguished Meachum and Mon-
tanye from Vitek by stating that "in those cases transfers were
discretionary with the prison authorities, and in neither case did
the prisoner possess any right or justifiable expectation that he
would not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occur-
rence of other specified events."38 The Court then cited Enomoto
for the proposition that "state statutes may grant prisoners liberty
interests that invoke due process protection when prisoners are
transferred to solitary confinement for disciplinary or administra-
tive reasons."8 9 The prisoner threatened with transfer to a mental
hospital, the Court found, had a similar liberty interest in avoiding
such a transfer and thus was entitled to a hearing.40
III. DECISIONS OF LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The principles developed by the Supreme Court to govern prison
transfers have understandably received varying interpretations
among lower federal courts. Some circuits have read Meachum and
Montanye to be inapplicable to cases involving disciplinary mea-
sures such as confinement or segregation.4 Others have held that
the cases preclude a finding of due process rights even where disci-
plinary transfers are involved.42 A split has also developed as to
whether section 5003 of Title 1843 and derivative state statutes,
37. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
38. Id. at 489.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 489-90.
41. See Aikens v. Lash, 547 F.2d 372, 373 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Bruce v. Wade,
537 F.2d 850, 854 n.9 (5th Cir. 1976). The Fifth Circuit has stated that "[p]lacing a prisoner
in disciplinary confinement clearly affects the prisoner's liberty interest ... and thus in-
vokes the protections of the due process clause." Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 873 (5th Cir.
1981) (due process protection applied only to state-created liberty interests).
42. See Hohman v. Hogan, 597 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (inmate trans-
ferred to segregated confinement for two weeks); Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 356 (10th
Cir. 1978) (transfer to maximum custody held to be within discretion of prison officials).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 5003 (1976), which provides in part-
(a) The Attorney General, when the Director shall certify that proper and ade-
quate treatment facilities and personnel are available, is hereby authorized to con-
tract with the proper officials of a State or Territory for the custody, care, subsis-
tence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenses in
588 [Vol. 16:583
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which permit transfer of state prisoners to federal institutions if
they need specialized treatment, create an expectation that no
transfer will be made without a showing of such need.
44
Most courts, in determining whether due process protections at-
tach, have looked beyond the label given to the transfer and sought
an expectation that the transfer is conditioned on certain acts or
circumstances of the inmate. Where federal prisoners are con-
cerned, some courts have interpreted section 4082 of Title 1845 to
give complete discretion to the Attorney General to transfer these
federal inmates, obviating any expectation for a hearing.46 Other
courts have found an expectation to be embodied in federal prison
regulations47 or even policy statements.4 In addressing due process
issues raised by state prisoners, circuit courts have found no ex-
pectation of non-transfer in Oklahoma,'4 9 Vermont,50 Massachu-
setts,51 New Jersey,52 and Florida.53
the courts of such State or Territory....
44. For cases finding no expectation, see Beshaw v. Fenton, 635 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1980);
Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d 1126 (3d Cir. 1980) (based on a Virgin Islands statute); Sisbarro v.
Warden, 592 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); Cofone v. Manson, 594 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1979) (based on
Connecticut statutes). For cases finding an expectation that showing of special need must be
made, see Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1980); Lono v. Fenton, 581 F.2d
645 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1976), which provides in part:
(b) The Attorney General may designate as a place of confinement any available,
suitable, and appropriate institution or facility, whether maintained by the Federal
Government or otherwise, and whether within or without the judicial district in which
the person was convicted, and may at any time transfer a person from one place of
confinement to another.
46. Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1980); Beck v. Wilkes, 589 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.
1979). The Attorney General's authority has been delegated to the Bureau of Prisons. 28
C.F.R. §§ 50.95 to -.96 (1979).
47. Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980).
48. Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977).
49. Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1978) (transfer from minimum to maximum
security custody).
50. Hohman v. Hogan, 597 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1979) (transfer to segregated confinement in
the maximum security wing of a second facility).
51. Daigle v. Hall, 564 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1977) (transfer from general population to de-
partmental segregation).
52. Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981) (initial assignment to isolation).
53. Franklin v. Fortner, 541 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1976) (transfer from minimum-medium
security to maximum security). In 1980, however, the Fifth Circuit limited Franklin's hold-
ing of no expectation to the statutes and regulations discussed in that case. Mitchell v.
Hicks, 614 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1980). In Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 875 (5th Cir.
1981), the court affirmed a decision that a transfer to disciplinary segregation could not be
labeled administrative to take it out of the Wolff due process requirement.
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Gibson v. Lynch,5" which found no right to a hearing in New
Jersey, demonstrates the free hand that such an interpretation
gives to prison administrators. The inmate in this case had been
guilty of no infraction in prison and had demonstrated no need for
solitary confinement, but he was nevertheless assigned to solitary
during his first ninety days in prison, 55 ostensibly because of over-
crowding in the New Jersey facilities. Even though New Jersey
prison regulations prohibited assigning an inmate to solitary for
more than thirty days, the Third Circuit nevertheless concluded
that these regulations had given rise to no expectation that an ar-
ticulated reason and a pre-assignment hearing would be given
before the inmate spent ninety days in solitary confinement. 0
Other circuits, however, have found that an expectation of non-
transfer, absent specified reasons for the transfer, does arise out of
California 57 and Delaware 8 statutes; Pennsylvania,," New York,60
Illinois,6' Puerto Rico, 2 and Tennessee"3 regulations; and Illinois
prison practices.04 Although courts differ in their interpretations of
non-transfer expectations, the circuits have been consistent, how-
ever, in holding that a transfer made in retaliation for exercise of
first amendment rights violates the United States Constitution.6 5
IV. FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
The Fourth Circuit has consistently applied Meachum and
Montanye to preclude a need for pre-transfer due process protec-
tions. The first decisions on the issue, which were rendered in pro
54. 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981).
55. The inmate had been sentenced for three to five years in prison for possession of a
stolen vehicle. His environment while in maximum security isolation included meals from a
cart in his cell; six recreation periods in three months; no radio or television; denial of per-
sonal access to the prison library, community religious services, work or vocational training,
and regular yard recreation; and denial of entry into the general prison population. Id. at
350-51.
56. Id. at 355.
57. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1978).
58. Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980).
59. Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487 (3d Cir. 1981).
60. McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087
(1978).
61. Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980).
62. Garcia v. DeBatista, 642 F.2d 11 (lst Cir. 1981).
63. Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980).
64. Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978).
65. See, e.g., Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978); Haymes v. Montanye, 547
F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
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se litigation, did not address the matter of expectations created by
statutes or regulations.6 In a recent decision, the Fourth Circuit
held that a North Carolina inmate had no expectation that a trans-
fer to a lower custody institution would be granted after a substan-
tial period of consistent good behavior.67
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, on the
other hand, has on several occasions found an expectation of due
process protections arising from guidelines issued by the Virginia
Department of Corrections. 6 These guidelines grant several proce-
dural protections to an inmate faced with transfer to another
prison6 9 or to segregation within the same prison.70 One guideline 1
delineates the requirements for transfer to Mecklenburg Correc-
tional Center, a long-term segregation facility designated to house
inmates who are guilty of specific enumerated offenses or who re-
quire high security protective custody. The Eastern District has in-
terpreted this last guideline to establish an expectation that an in-
mate would not be transferred to Mecklenburg except in one of
these two circumstances. 2 Further, in Lamb v. Hutto73 the district
court concluded that since a pre-transfer hearing conforming to
published procedural standards was given as a standard practice in
Virginia, the state inmate had a justifiable expectation of such a
hearing before transfer to Mecklenburg."'
In 1981, the Fourth Circuit decided in Gorham v. Hutto5 that
66. Russell v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1977); Cale v. Paderick, 546 F.2d 577 (4th Cir.
1976); Cooper v. Riddle, 540 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1976).
67. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1980).
68. See, e.g., Shah v. Mitchell, No. 80-0100-R (E.D. Va. April 23, 1981); Lamb v. Hutto,
467 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1979).
69. GUmIELNs, supra note 2, at No. 825 (Oct. 15, 1977), No. 821 (IX)(B) (Sept. 1, 1977).
70. Id. at No. 821 (IX)(B) (Sept. 1, 1977).
71. Id. at No. 825 (VI)(K) (July 12, 1979).
72. Crowell v. Landon, No. 79-0949-R (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 1980). But see note 75 infra.
73. 467 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1979).
74. Id. at 566. Judge Merhige, who decided Lamb, subsequently held in Bukhari v. Hutto,
487 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1980), that due process did not attach to decisions to continue
an inmate in "C" custody (the highest level of custody for general population inmates in
Virginia). Citing Cooper v. Riddle, 540 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1976) and Meachum, Judge Mer-
hige stated that "decisions to transfer prisoners from one institution to another or to reclas-
sify prisoners have been held outside the scope of the due process clause." 487 F. Supp. at
1168.
75. No. 81-6020 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 1981). In Tuller v. Hutto, No. 80-6716, slip op. at 2 (4th
Cir. Feb. 2, 1982), the Fourth Circuit in a per curiam opinion cited Gorham for the proposi-
tion that transfers to Mecklenburg "do not involve a constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est." The court held that a transfer from general population to solitary confinement "was
within the discretion of the prison officials and did not infringe on constitutionally protected
1982]
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"prison policy guidelines are not a sufficient basis for affording
state prisoners a liberty interest in not being transferred to other
prison institutions within the same state. 7 The inmates involved
had all been transferred to Mecklenburg after hearings allegedly
not in compliance with Guideline 821, which delineates the proce-
dural protections provided an inmate who is subject to reclassifica-
tion for transfer or other purposes." The court did not discuss
Guideline 825, which governs transfers to Mecklenburg and other
institutions. 8 Consequently, the holding was limited to the issue of
whether setting forth procedural protections created an expecta-
tion that such protections would be provided before transfer. As
the dissent noted, the court's holding appears to be inconsistent
with case law, Enomoto in particular.
On the same day that Gorham was decided, another panel ruled
in Ward v. Johnson"0 that an eight-day loss of privileges had been
improperly imposed because of failure to call the inmate's wit-
nesses in violation of Guideline 861, which governs disciplinary
proceedings.81 Although lost privileges would not ordinarily require
due process protections, the court determined that the test set
forth in Wolff "is the severity of the potential punishment and not
the actual punishment."8 2
V. VIRGINIA APPLICATIONS
Taken together, the cases arising within the Fourth Circuit indi-
cate that an inmate faced with transfer to segregated confinement
at Mecklenburg which may extend for a year or more has no due
process rights, while the inmate faced with transfer from segrega-
tion to isolation for fifteen days, only a slight difference in condi-
tions at Mecklenburg, has a constitutional right to a full hearing. A
recent change in the method of computing good time credit in Vir-
ginia makes this distinction even less tenable. Inmates sentenced
after July 1, 1981, and those sentenced before that date who so
elect, will have their time calculated under the good conduct allow-
rights." Id.
76. No. 81-6020, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 1981).
77. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at No. 821 (Sept. 1, 1977).
78. Id. at No. 825 (Oct. 5, 1977).
79. No. 81-6020, slip op. at 12-13 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 1981).
80. No. 79-6304 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 1981).
81. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at No. 861 (Nov. 29, 1977).
82. No. 79-6304, slip op. at 9 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 1981).
592 [Vol. 16:583
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ance system. 3 Instead of the previous general rule of ten days of
good time credit for every twenty days served, a prisoner can now
earn from zero to thirty days of good time credit for every thirty
days served, depending upon the class in which he is placed. Spe-
cifically, an inmate who has been placed in isolation or segregation
for disciplinary reasons is in Class IV and earns no good time
credit.8 4 He must continue in that class for at least ninety days.
8 5
The inmate transferred to Mecklenburg because of behavioral
problems is also reduced to Class IV."' Thus a sentence to either
disciplinary or administrative segregation precludes an inmate
from earning good time credit, and he loses the right to gain any
reduction in the length of his sentence while in such confinement.
It would appear that if the loss of good time entitles an inmate to
due process protection,8 7 loss of the potential for earning such
credit should have a similar effect. Under this close analysis the
distinction between administrative and disciplinary confinement as
a basis for determining due process application breaks down and
cannot properly support such disparate treatment of prison trans-
fers. Yet in practice the distinction remains.
The case law initiated by Meachum and Montanye has in many
instances put the decision most important to the inmate-that of
his physical status in confinement-beyond judicial review, not be-
cause the courts have carefully determined that any impact or in-
jury to the inmate caused by the action is slight, but because state
authorities have granted themselves unfettered discretion to make
these decisions. This administrative power over the rights of other
men appears all the more inequitable when one considers the fol-
lowing remarks of Justice Harshbarger of the West Virginia Su-
preme Court:
Our federal and state constitutions do not give liberty to people:
they protect a free people from deprivation of their God-given free-
dom by governments. The entitlement to liberty and freedom must
follow every citizen from birth to death, however mean or degener-
ate he may be viewed by his government or his peers at any given
time along the way.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-209.1 to -209.5 (Cur. Supp. 1981); GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at
No. 806 (VIII)(A) (July 1, 1981).
84. GUIDELINES, surpa note 2, at No. 806 (VIII)(H)(1), (2) (July 1, 1981).
85. Id. at No. 806 (VIII)(H)(2)(a) (July 1, 1981).
86. Id. at No. 806 (VIII)(H)(5) (July 1, 1981).
87. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
1982]
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And so, the physical deprivation of his liberty must at every stage
carry the burden upon the state to overcome the great presumption
that he is a free man. His constitutional rights follow him into
prison, or mental hospital, or military servitude, or wherever he is
forced by the government to be.
Therefore, although it is true that restrictions upon liberty are im-
plicit in the penal system, each must be imposed reluctantly; and
new ones, with due process of law.88
In his dissent in Meachum, Justice Stevens discussed the major-
ity's analysis that the liberty interest must be based on constitu-
tional or state law.
If a man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be cor-
rect. But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States
create the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The rele-
vant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the
sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen .... Of course, law
is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a
complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not
the exclusive source.
I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their
Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is
that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather
than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or
regulations. 89
After determining that the deprivation of liberty imposed upon
inmates was not total but merely partial, he concluded by discuss-
ing the legal status of incarcerated inmates: "It is unquestionably
within the power of the state to change that status abruptly and
adversely; but if the change is sufficiently grievous, it may not be
imposed arbitrarily. In such case due process must be afforded.""0
VI. CONCLUSION
That the Supreme Court should experience real difficulty and
consequent reluctance in dealing with prison problems is not sur-
prising. The judicial system is not presently provided with the
equipment and personnel to analyze in detail all correctional
88. Watson v. Whyte, - W. Va. -, -, 245 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
89. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 234.
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problems. Yet for the Court to abandon those persons most in
need of due process protections, instead of adapting to deal with
the challenges before the Court, is a clear warning of the fragility
of all constitutional rights. As the law now stands, a prisoner may
be locked in a cage for years at the whim of prison officials. The
inability to prevent losing the slight residue of freedom left to a
prison inmate constitutes a clear failure of the legal system. Those
limited freedoms are all the more important and valuable to the
inmate because he has so few. They deserve a special and careful
protection.

